I. Introduction
Sometimes the greatest investment opportunities are in those areas where the least progress seems to be taking place. This report describes energy-based developments that are taking place in the Persian Gulf. Relations between the United States and two countries covered by this review, Iran and Iraq, are currently dismal. No formal diplomatic relations exist and prospects of warm relations seem remote. Despite apparent oil wealth, both Iran and Iraq are experiencing domestic economic hardships due to their difficulties with the outside world and to low oil prices. From an investment or trade standpoint, it is tempting to write off each nation as not promising. The truth might be the opposite if an investor also has patience. The isolation of Iran and Iraq is bound to be transient though the end is perhaps not immediate, much as was the case earlier of formerly isolated nations such as China or Vietnam. When the isolation ends, Iran and Iraq might promise a well prepared investor more returns than could be found elsewhere in the region.
The rest of the Persian Gulf consists of the six nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman. These nations are forging closer political and economic ties with each other though there is considerable question as to how much sovereignty each would willingly yield for a common interest. We doubt that any would give up as much sovereignty as has been forgone in the European Union, but similar political and social systems permit and encourage close cooperation when required. Their economic interests are generally the same, based on oil and gas production, refining, and exports. The GCC thus is an interest group or trade bloc as much as it represents efforts toward internal economic integration.
The Arab nations of the Gulf prefer to call it the Arabian Gulf. We follow the area's original mapmaker, Ptolemy, and the convention of the English language in calling it the Persian Gulf. For the sake of the curious, Ptolemy's Arabian Gulf was the Red Sea. His Red Sea was the Gulf of Aden joint ventures in aspects of its economy. Usually GCC members require involvement of either the national oil company or some other nationally dominated firm in large investments. This situation is changing, however. Saudi Arabia is receptive to private investments in petrochemicals, Kuwait is opening management contracts for its major oil fields and is seeking foreign oil exploration, and Bahrain and Oman now seek private participation in their electricity generation. Saudi Arabia is now talking about privatizing several government-owned firms, while Bahrain, Dubai within the UAE, and Oman are receptive to a variety of foreign investments. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and others are also developing private oil firms that have invested in a variety of domestic and foreign endeavors. A contrast of sorts might be Qatar, which insists on involvement of its state oil company in most investments.
The Business Environment in the Persian Gulf
Central to the energy environment of the Persian Gulf is the national oil company. Such companies have ranged from Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) and some firms in the UAE that have private and foreign participation dating back to World War I to Saudi Aramco or the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which are monopolies fully owned by their respective governments. Most Gulf nations now allow some form ofjoint venture within the oil industry, with downstream activities particularly favored, but government control remains the dominant trend. Kuwait and Iran have recently experimented with upstream management contracts, and Oman and some individual emirates within the UAE permit private foreign-owned exploration. Iraq permitted upstream joint ventures prior to the Gulf and Iran-Iraq Wars. Such relationships might resume with any readmission to Iraq to the world oil trade. There is a definite trend in all sectors toward increased private participation that is more intense in nations that either are having fiscal difficulties due to today's relatively low oil prices or face the need to upgrade their oil recovery procedures. Table 1 . Reserve figures should be accepted with caution, because such figures reflect both the results of exploration and the interplay of oil politics. Most nations in the Gulf belong to OPEC (Oman and Bahrain do not), where both reserve and historic production levels have been used to justifl production quotas. Also, the rate of oil or gas recovery is related to reservoir structure and management. Technically and economically advisable production-to-reserve ratios can vary widely among producers. Finally, many products such as natural gas liquids and condensates can be defined in ways that defy the OPEC quota system. Production figures thus are often arranged by nations to include or exclude such numbers as is convenient. Sources: Oil and Gas Journal (oil) and BP Review of World Gas I994 (gas).
Note: Neutral Zone allocated between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
Domestic politics have forced nations of the Gulf to assert that they are diversifling their economies away fiom oil and gas dependence. This can be misleading and much claimed diversification has been into petrochemicals, which we consider an energy industry. Further, touted diversifications such as agriculture in Saudi Arabia or aluminum, iron, and steel in Bahrain or the UAE are subsidized by low energy costs.
Subsidies are the characteristic of Gulf nations and not the exception. Not just oil products, gas, and electricity are provided at subsidized prices, but also food, consumer goods, and housing. Local economies are thus subjected to substantial price distortions.
Occasionally situations arise where public utilities make net negative contributions to gross national product as a result. Recent low oil revenues have highlighted the cost of these subsidies, as Gulf nations have struggled with budget deficits brought on by subsidy costs, weak tax bases, and a recent history of abundance. Most are cutting back on subsidies rather than instituting taxes. Even now it is difficult to say what the true "economic" cost of many goods and services are, amidst the maze of government involvement within the commercial sector. Without a clear view of such costs, for example, can it be said that the massive investment in petrochemicals over the recent decades adds to net economic welfare? Or have they taken revenues from one pocket (oil production) and put them in another?
Each Gulf nation has experienced rapid population increases brought on by some of the world's highest birthrates and by improved health standards. This has produced many young citizens with diffrculty finding rewarding careers. Gulf nations have responded by restricting many employment positions (many subsidized) to their nationals in preference to expatriates. Expatriate numbers are schedule to decline in the process, while the expatriate population is increasing from nations where workers accept lower wage levels. It is debatable whether the new employees, domestic and expatriate, have the same skills as the original expatriates.
Despite their fabled wealth, the Gulf nations are now experiencing relatively hard economic times. This means that they will continue to provide opportunities for foreign investors within their energy industries, but also that the character of these opportunities will become an evolving factor. Governments are learning to pay more attention to their budgets in the process.
Investment Opportunities in the Persian Gulf

Iran
General: Iran's interest in foreign participation in its economy has been intensified by deterioration of the domestic economy, which has been characterized by excessive inflation and prices that do not reflect costs or availability. Iran believes itself to be open to foreign energy investments but prefers that foreigners participate in the oil industry through service contracts. Some joint venture arrangements have been recently offered.
The apparent need to permit foreign involvement in many aspects of economic development has often run afoul of domestic political requirements that strive for internal political, religious, and social integrity. This is a long-standing conflict within Iran that predates the Revolution and will probably outlast it. The result has been mercurial policies that discourage all but the most hearty investor.
The government is on record in favor of privatizing government-controlled indus- production is around 20 billion cubic meters of gas per year. Plans call for the increased use of gas for domestic energy needs as a substitute for oil, which is seen as having a higher export value. Domestic gas service is being expanded in the major cities.
The Central Asian republics are looking for secure export routes for their oil and gas. Iran has willingly offered to become part of the process, giving geographic access to either Turkey or to the Gulf, both potential shipping points. So far the principal result has been an agreement with Turkmenistan to pipe gas through Iran to Turkey and Bulgaria.
Russia and Kazakhstan would also participate in the arrangement. Iran would fund half of the costs of the Iranian portion of the pipeline. A shorter gas pipeline through Iran might serve nearby but isolated Nakhichevan in Azerbaijan with gas fiom Azerbaijan proper. Energy hungry Georgia and Armenia might also receive gas from Iran by pipeline.
Iran has its own gas pipeline plans and supports the idea of a regional trunk line linking the Middle East's gas reserves to Asia and Europe. Progress on such efforts would be slow, given the political differences within the region. Components are more likely to develop before an entire system comes into being. A gas pipeline from Qeshm
Island to can take a variety of feedstocks. The Isfahan complex will use naphtha from a nearby refinery as a feedstock and is designed to produce derivative chemicals based on heavier olefins. Iran's facilities are designed for both export and domestic markets.
Iran also produces natural-gas-based petrochemicals. A 660,000 tonnedyear methanol plant is being built at Kharg Island, with half of its output slated for export when completed in 1998. A 60,000 tonnedyear methanol plant already exists at Shiraz.
A 750,000 tonnedyear urea plant is to be built on Qeshm Island, and a 100,000 tonnes/year urea plant at Shiraz will probably be expanded by 75 percent. An atnmonidurea plant in Khorasan Province might open in 1995.
Iran provides subsidies on feedstock cost (apparently 30% discounts on world prices) to petrochemical producers similar to those provided by other Gulf suppliers.
Such subsidies will become increasingly expensive as gas and oil reserves become committed to other economic uses.
Iraq
General: While Iraq is still subject to economic sanction on its oil and gas exports due to its invasion of Kuwait and subsequent precipitation of the Gulf War of 1990-9 1, many nations now speculate that this status will soon end. It remains the public policy of most members of the UN Security Council that Iraq has not met criteria set during and after the many citizens of the Gulf, with the Russian Federation, and others. Many businesses are quietly preparing for the lifting of the sanctions. Still it remains a matter of speculation when this will take place. Some smuggling of oil exports is rumored-through Iran, Jordan, and Turkey-but the volumes are a small portion of Iraq's potential. Iraq like other
Gulf states has targeted public sector corporations for privatization to local shareholders.
It has had difficulty finding domestic parties willing to purchase such assets at acceptable prices.
Oil: Iraq's oil reserves, estimated at around 100 billion barrels, are among the most abundant in the world. Further, prospects of finding new oil reserves are generally regarded to be good. The UN embargo has limited oil production to around 500,000 Gas: Iraq can be expected to participate in any regional gas developments. Its gas reserves have been estimated at around 3 trillion cubic meters. Iraq could be both a supplier of natural gas and a transit area for shipments to more distant areas. In order to become a transit location (not argued here as a strong possiblity), relations with neighboring countries would have to improve. The improved ability of nations to build subsea gas pipelines will increase the ability of gas lines to select their transit routes. This should weaken Iraq's bargaining position in any joint pipeline efforts. KPC's European network is also to be expanded fiom 135,000 b/d to 300,000 Wd. Many of these investments will depend on Kuwait's ability to h d the ventures, a condition that will vary with oil prices and the country's receptiveness to joint venture participation.
Gas: Despite long term efforts to locate independent natural gas reserves, most gas in Kuwait is associated with oil production. Reserves are placed at 1.5 trillion cubic meters, a still substantial sum. Relatively low levels of gas reserves have limited Kuwait's ability to develop downstream investments in areas such as petrochemicals.
Electricity:
The main electricity market in Kuwait is limited to the city of Kuwait and to industrial regions located to the south along the coast. Industrial development is resuming following the Gulf War, and several electricity-intensive plans, notably in petrochemicals, are being developed near Shuaiba and other refining centers.
Kuwait is one of several Gulf nations that is considering a 750 mile electricity interconnection along the southern and western Gulf. as is the case in nearby Saudi Arabia and Iran. This plan has been on the books since before the Gulf War, but had been repeatedly delayed. It apparently will now go through.
Derivative product facilities for polyethylene and ethylene glycol will consume much of the plant's output. MTBE facilities are also being considered. A planned 100,000 tonnedyear polypropylene facility at Shuaiba would receive propylene feedstock by pipeline fiom the nearby Mina a l -W a d i refinery's fluidized catalytic cracking unit. Amoco is also interested in possible aromatics supplies fiom Kuwait.
Saudi Arabia
General: The Saudi economy still depends on state-controlled corporations that are active in areas such as oil, gas, petrochemicals, and transportation. The government intends to privatize parts of this structure, though Saudi Aramco, the national oil company, is effectively off limits and Saudia, the airline, is in such bad financial shape that no one seems to know how to privatize it. Petrochemicals are an area where foreign joint ventures are permitted and in which the national company, Saudi Basic Industries (Sabic), has private shareholders. Generally, shares in Saudi corporations are available only to Saudi nationals, and joint ventures require significant Saudi ownership. There is consid-erable private capital available, and there is a willingness to invest some of that capital
domestically. Yet M e r private funds are stored in overseas investments and accounts.
Oil: Saudi Aramco enjoys a monopoly in most exploration, production, transportation, and wholesale marketing of oil and gas in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Aramco also has a mo- will not permit as high production-to-reserves ratios as do classical sandstone formations.
Thus, increases in sustainable production levels in Saudi Arabia require more investment expense than might be expected. Given Saudi Arabia's excess of available reserves, foreign participation, in the form of equity, is usually regarded as not likely outside of the Neutral Zone, where foreign f m s have long been active. Surprisingly, however, there are preliminary indications that the remote Shaybah oil field might also be opened to foreign participation.
Refining for export has been an area where the Saudis formerly have sought joint venture activities. Local oil product markets are growing rapidly, owing to low retail prices and to subsidies elsewhere in the economy (such as agriculture). Saudi Armco's take fiom the "export" refineries has been increasingly devoted to meeting domestic needs especially for middle distillates and gasoline. This will most likely lead to further upgrading of existing refineries (already planned and in many cases under way) and perhaps even new facilities. Joint venture refineries with the Japanese within Saudi Arabia have been announced and apparently abandoned. There remains a possibility that some refined oil products might be imported into Saudi Arabia if refining facilities are not expanded rapidly enough. Saudi Arabia's 1995 government budget includes a 6 percent reduction in expenditures, some of which is to come from reductions in subsidies on oil products, including gasoline. In consequence, domestic retail oil product prices have been effectively doubled to levels still substantially below international product prices.
Gas: Saudi Aramco enjoys an effective monopoly over most aspects of natural gas production and distribution in Saudi Arabia. Most gas produced in Saudi Arabia is associated with oil production, but the days when a decrease in crude oil production also meant a domestic shortage of natural gas are gone. This is partly due to higher levels of crude oil production and partly to the development of deep gas sources from lower strata of the large Ghawar oil field and from the Central region's new fields. Proven gas reserves are now placed at 182 trillion cubic feet and should rise with time.
Natural gas has been the preferred source of he1 for desalination plants in Saudi Arabia. The nation's demands for such water have been substantial. The same plants also supply part of local electricity requirements. A large portion of this water has been used for agricultural developments that have succeeded in making Saudi Arabia an exporter of several crops, notably wheat, but at operating costs that have proven to be a drain on the national treasury (through subsidies). The government has recently diminished agricultural subsidies as a budget-controlling measure. It is not yet clear whether this will mean a decrease in the requirements for gas in desalinization.
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have proposed a gas pipeline that would cross Saudi Arabia does not presently have independent power producers generating electricity for the national grid, but is very much concerned about financing future electricity requirements. The government has recently indicated that private sector investment in electricity might be permitted. The country is also committed to offering $5 billion in shares of the SCECO f m s to the public by 2000. Shares in Saudi corporations are usually available only to Saudi nationals. We believe that some form of independent power production is inevitable through joint ventures. Experience in other sectors of Saudi Arabia indicates that local participation will be required and that a government-managed entity (i.e., a SCECO utility) might be the most reliable choice. Existing electricity tariffs (even though now raised) would preclude private incentives to participate, without sub- percent discounts in natural gas feedstock prices fiom Saudi Aramco and through low prices for electricity used in the production of petrochemicals. The availability of these discounts to other petrochemical investors (Le., not Sabic) has been subject to considerable debate. Saudi Aramco and the SCECO system find the subsidies economic burdens and feel that such subsidies might lead to inefficient investments. It appears that these subsidies might become more generally available, but we expect that subsidies, even to Sabic, will be questioned, if international oil prices do not rise substantially and public funds are consequently scarce.
Early developments in the petrochemical area were centered on natural-gas-based petrochemicals and their derivatives. Specific attention was given to ethylene, methanol, and ammonia-derived products. Saudi interests have expanded more deeply into derivative products with methyl tert-butyl ether (MTBE, a gasoline additive), ethylene glycol, and polyethylene receiving particular attention. Sabic intends to develop a more complete array of petrochemicals in the future. Future developments will continue in these areas and will also involve heavier olefins (propylene, butylenes, and butadiene), aromatics (benzene and xylenes), and their derivatives (polypropylene, synthetic rubbers, styrene monomer, and polyesters). Opportunities will develop in these areas on a continuing basis, though many prospective partners have already been identified and will be given some market protection.
United Arab Emirates
General: The United Arab Emirates is a true federation. Its seven constituent emirates are autonomous city states that can often resist central authority. Each emirate has its own oil company and its own policies toward foreign participation in the industry. The major oil company in Abu Dhabi, the Abu Dhabi National Oil
Company (Adnoc), is by far the largest of these fms. Adnoc has recently found it necessary to spend considerable funds to maintain the productivity of its major Bab oil field through advanced recovery techniques.
Dubai's oil, among the more fieely traded of the Middle East crudes, had been used as a "marker crude" to estimate the prices of regional crudes that are less fieely traded. Declining production has recently reduced this role. Small amounts of oil have been found in the other emirates, but oil's direct contribution to their economies remains small.
Gas: Abu Dhabi has produced LNG at its Das Island plant for some time. Partners in the venture include Adnoc, Mitsui, BP, and Total. A third train was added to the plant in May 1994, doubling capacity to 5 million tomes per year. Abu Dhabi's claimed gas reserves are among the highest in the world.
Sharjah and Dubai also have large natural gas reserves, though together perhaps one-fourth the level of Abu Dhabi's gas reserves. While formerly a large portion of this gas was flared, in Sharjah at least, much of the gas now finds commercial or economic use.
Plans that have been put forward by Qatar to pipe natural gas to Pakistan would involve transiting the UAE. The project is also led by a Sharjah firm, Crescent Petroleum, and could become a basis of a gas network connecting the Middle East and South Asia.
Electricity:
The United Arab Emirates is among the Gulf nations that are studying the possibility of a regional electricity interconnection. We expect the UAE members would be interested in such possibilities, with some of the most ambitious members viewing an interconnection as an opportunity to sell some of the UAE's energy production to the western Gulf.
Petrochemicals:
The UAE has been slow to develop its petrochemical industry. As is the case in other sectors of the nation, each emirate has its own policies and plans in the industry. Plans for the most part are small except for an 825,000 tonneslyear methanol plant in Sharjah, which would be based on local methane feedstock. The plant would be operated in association with Amoco. Japanese f m s would assist in marketing the output. Amoco would also use some of the methane as feed in a planned MTBE facility.
Dubai's Jebel Ali port has attracted some small polyester manufacturing plants.
Bahrain
General: Bahrain is unique among the Gulf countries in that it is not a major crude oil producer. The Sitra refinery is, however, perhaps the region's oldest export-oriented refinery. Bahrain has long played a trading role with other Gulf nations and serves (as does Dubai) as a business base for f i r m s dealing with the Gulf as a whole. Generally, business activity in Bahrain depends more on commercial requirements than on subsidies. Nonetheless, Bahrain does depend on subsidies for its existence. Crude oil fiom Saudi Arabia is sent to the Sitra refinery, and domestic natural gas supplies are directed to facilities such as the Alba aluminum smelter on a preferential basis.
Oil: Bahrain's national oil marketing company, Bahrain Petroleum Company (Bapco), is the majority owner of the 250,000 b/d Sitra export refinery (which also includes Caltex participation). The output of the refinery has shifted in recent years to the production of more middle distillates and less fuel oil. Bapco is committed to upgrade and modernize the refinery, but the undertaking has been delayed owing to uncertainty of future profitable export markets, the Gulf War, and higher investment priorities placed on the expan- Gas: Part of the North FielWars gas field lies in Bahraini territory, though the reserves of the Bahraini portion have not been found to be substantial. Claimed reserves in Bahrain have been dropping in recent years. Bahrain hopes to use its gas reserves from the field in its future development plans. North Field gas is a major fuel source for the Alba aluminum plant, at an iron pelletizing facility, and for electricity generation. Plans for a 200,000 tonnedyear steel works and expansion of the electricity system would require more natural gas in the future.
' We placed domestic production in Bahrain around 100,000 b/d on our table above, using our Oil and Gas Journal statistics, even though this number is at least twice normal estimates for Bahrain. We suspect that the Journal might be including oil produced under arrangements governing oil fields jointly claimed by Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, though they are physically located in Saudi Arabian waters.
Electricity: Electricity in Bahrain is managed by a state-owned utility, Electricity Affairs. Electricity demand is now growing more rapidly than electricity supplies fiom Electricity Affairs. Electricity Affairs has been forced to buy electricity fiom Alba's aluminum facilities to avoid a shortfall. This is functionally the beginning of a local cogeneration industry.
Bahrain recently opened its electricity markets to independent power producers.
British Gas is now building a 400 MW gas fired power plant near Manama and has developed close relations with the government. The plant might be opened as early as mid-1995. Like many Gulf electricity plants, the Bahrain plant is associated with a water desalination facility. The desalination plant is being developed as a separate private joint venture.
Bahrain's electricity market is rather small, but one might speculate regarding would probably be required to find their own financing, to be refunded fkom sales fkom the expanded production.
Gas: Qatar's North Field gas field is part of the same structure as the Pars gas fields in
Iran and Bahrain's North Field. Much of Qatar's ambitions for economic development depends on gas in preference to oil. This is reinforced by a rather low OPEC oil quota.
Qatar now has two projects under development to develop gas liquefaction plants and a third is arising. Qatargas is scheduled for 1997-98 while Rasgas is targeted for 1999. 
Oman
General: The government of Oman intends to privatize the businesses that it currently holds. These include insurance, hotels, flour mills, cement, aviation services, and banks.
The difficulty with such plans is that Oman also seeks to expand industrial and energy services and activities, likewise with private funds. Omani participation is required in any domestic venture. This raises questions whether Oman has sufficient private capital to undertake all of the ventures and privatization that it wishes to do, especially at a time when oil revenues are depressed by low prices. Schedules for privatization and investment might have to be adjusted to meet requirements for local funds.
Oil: Oman's oil reserves are found in rather thin formations that tend to deplete rapidly. is progressing rapidly.
Oman is not among the Gulf nations said to be interested in a regional electricity grid. Barring further information, we attribute this to distance fiom the other regional markets. Oman is expanding its own internal electricity system and this has recently led to the initiation of a foreign contract to build a 180 km, 132 kV power line from the Muscat area into the central part of the nation. Further development of the transmission system can be expected, since Oman has several remote population centers. Many recent generation capacity activities have involved natural gas fuel.
Petrochemicals:
Oman's petrochemical industry has been slow to start, but Oman's revitalized business contacts with India are showing signs of extending to the industry. An
Indian-Omani joint venture is interested in building a 1.1 million tonnes/year ammonia and 1.45 million tonnedyear urea facility at Sur using natural gas feedstock. This is the only major petrochemical plan in Oman of which we are aware. Given the uncertain long term capacity of Oman's oil reserves, we would expect future commitments to petrochemical complexes to be cautious. Neighboring nations have more abundant potential feedstock supplies.
IV. Expected Industry Trends
Interpretations of business opportunities in the Persian Gulf are shaped by several factors including the dismal state of Iraq's and Iran's relations with the outside world, a desire to preserve elements of the local culture (including Islam), the current low prices of international oil, and the invasive system of subsidized prices in each nation. It would be a mistake to assume that any of these trends will persist in their current form, even though they are well entrenched.
The eight Gulf states are building their nations. Each has large minor& groups and swelling populations that are young and underemployed, if not idle and bored. Their economies are built on one product, hydrocarbons, and its derivatives (refined products and petrochemicals). While access to energy is needed to build a nation, energy itself seldom employs many. This problem is made more complex by large expatriate populations who provide services within the energy industry that local populations are not able to provide at comparable quality. Local populations would, however, seek equivalent wages if filling the positions. Expatriate populations are integrated into local societies and economies, and some expatriate groups have been present in the area for more than a generation. The apparent hostility of Iran and Iraq to outsiders is partly a response to this environment. It also explains the guarded access that many Gulf states have provided to contacts with the outside world.
Low oil prices are particularly transient. They are also institutional. Small changes in oil availability and in world demand can move prices significantly over short periods of time and can delay adjustments over longer periods. The current embargo on Iraqi oil exports is keeping perhaps two million barrels a day off world markets. All na-tions of the Gulf might face a significant price drop whenever Iraqi oil is again exported.
At the same time a rapid rise of world oil demand within the current regime of relatively low prices is particularly notable in the Asia-Pacific region and in parts of Latin America where economic growth is now rapid. This presents a demand-based scenario that in a few years might raise oil prices if adequate supplies are not found. Gulf nations cannot benefit fkom any oil price rise as they once did. Their populations have grown too rapidly for that.
The fall of communism in Europe has left the Gulf as an area with as extreme a system of price distortions as anywhere in the world, save perhaps China. High oil incomes and a private domestic distribution systems have often prevented these distortions fiom creating the shortages within the GCC states that might be expected. Iran and Iraq, the region's most populous nations, are contrasts to this and have experienced product and service shortages. Further, electricity supplies throughout the Gulf now show signs of becoming inadequate, partly because of demand-inducing low prices.
Low hydrocarbon prices have starved national budgets throughout the region.
One response has been area-wide policies reducing government roles in prices and industrial ownership. Nation-building goals and the domestic politics have retained an interest in central and government control of business activities, whatever the ownership structure. The result is a learning process and the learning is continuous and potentially painful. Policies change daily and are as capable of being changed back to original systems as into new ones. Oil, and to an extent gas, are likely to remain longest under government control. The nations of the Gulf lack experience with tax systems, and the oil and gas industries are the primary source of government revenue. 
